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Introduction
During the last decade, European competition policy has 
undergone major changes with the aim of contributing to 
the achievement of its main objective as enshrined in Article 
3(g) TEC, that a system ensuring undistorted competition 
should be included in Community activities. As part of these 
changes, Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 Decem-
ber 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 TEC (hereinafter the “Regu-
lation”) was adopted.1 This Regulation came into force on 
1 May 2004. The reason for its adoption was that, given the 
EC’s enlargement and the continuous globalisation of the 
economy, a centralised authorisation system managed by 
the European Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”) 
using Regulation 17/62 would no longer ensure effective 
application of competition rules and thus the completion of 
the single market.2
  In this regard the reform contained three main objec-
tives. The first of these is rigorous enforcement of compe-
tition law by concentrating on the most important cases 
involving a real EC interest. The second main objective is ef-
fective decentralisation, with the Commission, the National 
Competition Authorities (hereinafter “NCAs”) of the Member 
States and the national courts having concurrent powers to   
apply EC competition rules. Each of the 27 NCAs is now fully 
empowered to apply all elements of the above rules, inclu-
ding the exemption provisions of Article 81(3) TEC, a power 
previously reserved only for the Commission. The third main 
objective is simplification of control procedures, with the 
abolition of the notification and authorisation system.
 
  The European Competition Network (hereinafter “ECN”), 
which was introduced by the Regulation, is the implement-
ing instrument of the modernisation of the EU’s antitrust law 
enforcement, that is the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 
TEC. Together, the NCAs and the Commission form a network 
of public authorities which constitutes a forum for discus-
sion and cooperation in the application and enforcement of 
EC competition policy; this network is called the ECN. To this 
end the Commission has published a Notice specifying the 
principles applicable to this cooperation within the ECN.3  
  The aims of this paper are to provide a brief analysis of 
the functioning of the ECN, to present the results of a study 
undertaken by the European Institute of Public Administra-
tion (hereinafter “EIPA”) in this context, and to conclude on 
how successful its operation has been. 
ECN: the Background 
 
The Notice provides that the ECN must ensure an efficient 
division of work, mutual assistance between NCAs and an ef-
fective and consistent application of EC competition rules.  
Division of Work
As  the  new  system  is  governed  by  rules  of  parallel 
competences, an optimal division of work is required. The 
Notice clarifies that an NCA is well placed to deal with a case 
if three conditions are met: 
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  the territory in which the authority is based;
2.  the authority can effectively bring to an end the entire 
  infringement; 
3.  the authority can effectively gather the evidence required   
  to prove the infringement. 
  It is important to point out in this context that, although 
the ECN provides the framework for efficient work sharing 
between NCAs by means of the exchange of information 
mechanism, it does not decide on the division of the work, 
nor do the Commission or the NCAs themselves. In practice 
NCAs start, conduct and possibly conclude the proceedings 
in accordance with their own responsibility.
Mutual Assistance 
On  the  basis  of  Article  11(3)  of  the  Regulation,  any  NCA 
acting under Articles 81 or 82 TEC must inform the Com-
mission before or just after commencing its first formal in-
vestigative measure. The Commission has also accepted an 
equivalent obligation to inform NCAs under Article 11(2) of 
the Regulation. NCAs can furthermore assist each other in 
various fact-finding measures by means of a standard form 
containing limited details of the case concerned, such as the 
authority dealing with the case, the product, the territories 
and parties concerned, the alleged infringement, the sus-
pected duration of the infringement and the origin of the 
case.  
  Article 12 of the Regulation provides for the exchange 
of information between the Commission and the NCAs and 
between the NCAs themselves. 
Effective and Consistent Application 
of EC Competition Rules
Under Article 11(4) of the Regulation, an NCA must inform 
the Commission no later than 30 days before the adoption 
of a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to 
an end, accepting commitments or withdrawing the benefit 
of a block exemption Regulation. This information may also 
be made available to the other members of the ECN. 
  Under Article 11(6) of the Regulation, the Commission 
can initiate formal proceedings, thus relieving the respective 
NCA of its competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 TEC. If the 
NCA is already acting on a case, then the Commission shall 
only initiate proceedings after consulting with that NCA. 
  As stipulated in the Notice, the Commission will in princi-
ple only apply Article 11(6) of the Regulation if:
•	 ECN	members	envisage	conflicting	decisions	in	the	same	  
  case;
•	 ECN	 members	 envisage	 a	 decision	 which	 is	 obviously	  
	 in	conflict	with	consolidated	case	law;
•	 ECN	member(s)	is	(are)	unduly	drawing	out	proceedings	  
  in the case;
•	 There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 adopt	 a	 Commission	 decision	 to 
  develop Community competition policy; 
•	 The	NCA(s)	concerned	do	not	object.
 
  The reason behind Article 11(6) of the Regulation and the 
special responsibility granted to the Commission is the fact 
that in the current system, only Commission decisions can 
be challenged before Community courts, and not the de-
cisions of the NCAs. Therefore, entrusting the Commission 
with powers to develop Community competition policies is 
the only way to involve the Community courts directly in the 
judicial review of such developments and thus ensure the 
effective and consistent application of EC competition rules. 
Otherwise, where the case is not dealt with by the Commis-
sion, it is only possible to reach Community courts if national 
courts, which usually do not want to slow proceedings, are 
willing to request a preliminary ruling4.
ECN: the EIPA Study
The Commission’s initiative to modernise the antitrust rules, 
the subsequent Council Regulation 1/2003 and the function-
ing of the ECN have attracted numerous comments and anal-
yses, as well as heavy criticism in the literature. 
  It has been stated that with the Regulation “the Commis-
sion has orchestrated a political masterstroke. It has given the 
impression of radical reform to the Member States by abolish-
ing the notification procedure and offered decentralisation 
provisions [...] which in no way undermine its central role [...] 
DG Competition has in fact managed to centralise European 
competition law more than under Regulation 17”. 5
  As far as the creation of the ECN is concerned, the criti-
cism is directed at the under-resourced NCAs, the systemic 
problems of sharing confidential information across the EU, 
the “case handling” question of who will take the lead in 
multi-jurisdictional cases, the greater degree of uncertainty 
for companies as they lose the simplicity of centralised clear-
ance from the Commission and the issue of accountability 
within the ECN.6
 
  The analysis below will attempt to provide answers to 
a number of issues that have been raised in the literature. 
This  analysis  is  based  among  other  things  on  a  study 
undertaken by EIPA on the basis of which a questionnaire 
was  prepared  and  sent  out  in  order  to  solicit  the  views 
of  the  NCAs  as  regards  the  functioning  of  their  own 
organisations  and  of  the  ECN.  The  questionnaire  was 
based  upon  a  number  of  principles  that  evidently 
govern the effective operation of networks: 
•	 Does	 the	 ECN	 (and	 its	 secretariat)	 have	 adequate	  
  resources?
•	 How	are	decisions	made	within	the	ECN?	Are	decisions	  
  made on the basis of qualified majority?
•	 What	ideally	should	be	the	role	of	the	ECN	vis-à-vis	its	  
  members? Could tasks be identified that maybe assigned 
   to  the  network,  over  which  ECN  should  have  clear   
  responsibility for their completion, and in collaboration   
  with members?
•	 Is	there	any	research	programme	defined	and	carried	out	  
  by the ECN?
•	 How	does	the	ECN	facilitate	the	establishment	of	a	system 
   for the bilateral exchange of information and experiences   
  on regulatory problems?
36
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•	 How	does	the	ECN	facilitate	the	establishment	of	a	system 
   for collecting information on the state and methods of 
  application of common rules by national authorities?
•	 How	 does	 the	 ECN	 help	 members	 to	 identify	 best 
  practices on issues of common concern?
•	 To	 what	 extent	 may	 national	 variations	 be	 justified 
  by the specific nature of national conditions?
Provide the ECN (and its secretariat) with more resources?
The  ECN  does  not  have  its  own  secretariat.  DG  Compe-
tition  has  five  to  six  members  of  staff  involved  in  the 
network.  It  has  not  yet  been  considered  whether  the 
establishment  of  a  secretariat  would  be  necessary,  given 
that the Regulation itself provides the legal basis for NCAs 
to exchange information and discuss implementation and 
interpretation issues. 
Introduce decision-making procedures based on qualified 
majority?
It was found that this is ir-
relevant in the context of 
the ECN. The network nei-
ther decides which cases 
should  be  pursued  nor 
which authority/ies would 
be  well  placed  to  carry 
out the investigation. Dis-
cussions  within  working 
groups  and  sub-groups 
are  based  on  consensus; 
however, the members of 
the  ECN  are  not  obliged 
to comply with the results 
achieved, as participation 
in those groups does not 
create  any  legal  rights. 
Nevertheless,  they  are 
obliged to make their best efforts to ensure compliance, 
whereas any deviation is subject to peer pressures. 
Identify tasks which could be assigned to the ECN for which 
the ECN should have clear responsibility for their comple-
tion, and in collaboration with members?
Under  the  ECN,  working  groups  for  horizontal  issues 
and sub-groups for sectoral issues have been established. 
The majority of the NCAs questioned replied that the ECN 
is carefully constructed and appropriately defined to ensure 
the effective and consistent application and implementation 
of EC competition rules. A minority criticised the establish-
ment of so many working groups and subgroups, as active 
participation in all forums was perceived as very resource-
consuming and difficult, particularly for small NCAs.
Define a research programme to be carried out by the ECN?
Ten out of 17 NCAs replied that they do not conduct
research on competition policy and law issues. Research is 
carried out at ECN level through the working groups and 
subgroups but no particular research plan is defined.  
Establish a system for the bilateral exchange of information 
and experiences on regulatory problems?
The  ECN  provides  a  valuable  forum  for  discussion  and 
cooperation among the NCAs. NCAs can now learn from 
each  others’  experiences,  coordinate  investigations,  help 
each other with investigations, exchange evidence and in-
formation and discuss issues of common interest. 
Thanks to the ECN’s interactive access and the electronic 
database containing details from the standard forms, NCAs 
can  also  be  informed  of  other  authorities’  main  contact 
persons. The ECN thus makes it possible for NCAs to iden-
tify among themselves who does what. It is not therefore a 
simple electronic connection; it is rather an effective daily 
working tool, an open network that allows, on the one hand, 
an exchange of confidential information and, on the other 
hand, easy interaction between the members of the net-
work. Consequently, cooperation can occur even in the ab-
sence of formal procedures or formal requirements.
Establish  a  system  for 
collecting information on 
the state and methods of 
application  of  common 
rules by national author-
ities?
Article 11(3) of the Regu-
lation  creates  an  obli-
gation  for  all  NCAs  to 
inform  the  Commission 
before  or  without  delay 
after  commencing  the 
first formal investigative 
measure  in  all  cases  in-
volving  the  application 
of Article 81 and 82 TEC. 
This information may be 
shared with other NCAs. 
  “In practice, the obligation to inform about new cases is 
complied with by uploading the relevant information in a 
common case-management system. This system was devel-
oped by the DG COMP IT-team and has been operational from 
1 May 2004.8 The system is secured against unauthorised ac-
cess and access rights are restricted to case-handlers and 
other authorised personnel of the competition authorities. 
The  IT-system  foresees  the  possibility  to  insert  standard-
ised information on, for instance, the parties, the products, 
the  territories,  the  alleged  infringement,  its  suspected 
duration, the contact details of the case handlers in charge 
etc. [...]”. 9 
  All  NCAs  that  replied  to  our  questionnaire  share 
the  same  view,  which  is  that  the  ECN  helps  them  to 
improve  their  enforcement  capabilities  in  relation  to 
competition  rules  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  ensure 
the coherence of the application of these rules.
Generally, the most important 
element that has come from the 
creation of the ECN is a “can do” 
attitude, and the way it has been 
embraced by all Member States 
and the willingness shown by all 
to attempt to accommodate each 
other and to share information 
when necessary
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The legal framework for the establishment of the ECN does 
not provide for the network to exercise any decision pow-
ers  in  order  to  achieve  harmonisation  of  rules.  The  ECN 
however,  as  its  members  report,  can  contribute  to  such 
harmonisation by adopting, through its sectoral subgroups 
and horizontal working groups, best practices on particular   
issues which could provide guidance to NCAs in relation to 
their enforcement activities or to their national parliaments 
in relation to reforming respective legislation.
  There  are  currently  numerous  subgroups  dealing 
with  particular  sectors  of  the  economy  (e.g.  banking, 
securities,  energy,  insurance,  food,  pharmaceuticals, 
professional  services,  healthcare,  environment,  motor 
vehicles,  telecommunications,  media,  IT  &  information  & 
communication, abuse of dominant position, Competition 
Chief Economist and railways). These groups meet at least 
twice  a  year  and  otherwise  exchange  information  via  a 
common intranet application.    
  There is also a small number of working groups that deal 
with horizontal issues pertaining to national laws on proce-
dures and sanctions10. It is important to note that the decision 
to attend a particular working group meeting is based on the 
relevance of the topic for discussion. Working groups there-
fore consist of NCA officials who volunteer to participate. DG 
Competition is present in all subgroups and working groups. 
Each working group currently has around 15 to 18 participa- 
ting NCAs.
  To provide an example of a best practice, the ECN has 
recently launched an ‘ECN Model Leniency Programme’ that 
improves the way in which parallel leniency applications are 
handled in the ECN. The purpose of this model is to ensure 
that potential leniency applicants are not discouraged from 
applying as a result of the discrepancies between the exist-
ing leniency programmes within the ECN.11
Consider when national variations may be justified by the 
specific nature of national conditions?
In  the  sphere  of  competition  law  there  are  few  issues 
that are situated at the interface between uniform Com-
munity  Law  and  diverse  national  laws,  such  as  those  on   
procedures and sanctions. Although the Regulation introduces 
parallel competences between the Commission and the NCAs   
with  provisions  on  mutual  assistance  and  close  co-
operation,  it  does  not,  on  the  other  hand,  harmonise 
national  rules  on  procedures  and  sanctions,  which   
remain heterogeneous.
 
The  rights  of  complainants  (e.g.  right  to  access  a  file  or 
attend  an  oral  hearing,  right  to  reply  to  a  statement  of   
objections or rights relating to the treatment of confidential 
information)  are  therefore  different  from  one  system  to   
another. In some jurisdictions, such as the Irish legal system, 
it would be extremely difficult to harmonise procedures and 
sanctions given that under that system, the fines imposed 
on undertakings for breach of competition rules are at the 
discretion of the national courts. 
	 However,	irrespective	of	which	NCA	deals	with	a	case,	the	
application of competition law must be the same. Article 
3(1) of the Regulation obliges NCAs to apply EC law to agree-
ments and practices which are capable of affecting trade 
between Member States. Article 3(2) of the Regulation pre-
vents them from reaching a different conclusion when they 
apply national laws to restrictive agreements. The only scope 
for divergence, which remains after the modernisation, is in 
the field of unilateral behaviour, which may be treated more   
severely under national law than under Article 82 EC.
  The Regulation has established mechanisms to ensure 
that competition law is applied consistently and efficiently. 
Pursuant to Article 11(4) of the Regulation, NCAs are thus 
subject to an obligation to consult the Commission before 
adopting  important  decisions  (e.g.  prohibition  and  com-
mitments). In practice, they may consult on a draft deci-
sion or also on a statement of objections. In addition, the 
ECN Notice indicates that the Commission is not prevented, 
obviously for purposes of consistency, from adopting a deci-
sion after an NCA decision has been made.12
Conclusion
After almost five years of operation, the way the ECN has 
been functioning so far appears to be very positive. It has 
certainly gained the support of its members, whose commit-
ment and professional attitude have been of great impor-
tance.  
  Work sharing and the exchange of information contrib-
ute to the identification of best practices and also contribute 
to the effective and efficient solution of clearly pre-defined 
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key issues of common interest, as in the case of leniency   
applications, which have proven to be efficient and success-
ful tools in the ECN members’ fight against hardcore cartels.13
  The study has shown that all initial criticism and fears of 
failure have been effectively tackled. In addition to conduct-
ing formal cooperation amongst its members, the ECN’s main 
achievement has been to enhance the strong links between 
members, either through their joint efforts in the working 
groups or more informally, by contacting each other.  It has 
been reported to us that, as a result of the creation of the 
ECN, the gates of communication are now wide open and 
case handlers from different NCAs across the EU openly dis-
cuss, even outside the ECN, both general policy issues and 
individual cases.14
  Generally, the most important element that has come 
from the creation of the ECN is a “can do” attitude, and the 
way it has been embraced by all Member States and the 
willingness shown by all to attempt to accommodate each 
other and to share information when necessary.15 The ECN 
has	been	designed	in	such	a	way	so	as	to	minimise	conflict	
amongst its members.16
  It must also be pointed out that the Commission retains its 
managerial role within the ECN, thereby creating a mechanism 
that aims to tackle legal uncertainty and minimise the risks 
of inconsistent policy enforcement under decentralisation in 
the face of a lack of previous strong network experience by 
the	NCAs.	The	latter’s	role	is	not	to	influence	the	competition	
assessment of the Commission in individual cases. On the 
contrary, taking into account the fact that the Commission is 
responsible for the coherent implementation of the EC com-
petition rules, the NCAs’ objective is to cooperate fully with 
each other and to exchange opinions and information with 
the aim of effectively and efficiently applying the competition 
rules in their respective jurisdictions. By sharing this know- 
ledge, we are certain that a common competition culture in 
the EU is soon to be established.
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